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THE RISING TIDE OF LIBEL LITIGATION:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GERTZ
NEGLIGENCE RULE
Barry F. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION
There are good reasons for the dramatic increase in the num-
ber of libel suits brought against the news media in the last few
years. Such litigation offers potentially high financial returns, and
the very media subject to such high judgments amply inform the
public of the lawsuits and judgments against them. Some of the
more familiar judgments include the $2.05 million award to the
president of Mobil Corporation in his suit against the Washington
Post for its story that he had funneled millions of dollars in Mobil
business to his son; $1.6 million awarded to actress Carol Burnett
in her suit against the National Enquirer for a story depicting an
incident in which she allegedly had been drunk and rowdy in a
Washington, D.C. restaurant; $26.5 million awarded to a former
Miss Wyoming in her suit against Penthouse magazine for a
fictional account of a sexually prolific woman allegedly portraying
her.1
The trend toward high libel judgments is clear. It has reached
the point where leading media lawyers are predicting that one of
the next changes the United States Supreme Court will make in
libel law will be to set constitutionally required limits on the
amount of damages libel plaintiffs may recover.'
Of course, for every libel lawsuit lost by a media defendant in
front of a generous jury, several others are either settled out of
court or won by the defendants. Professor Marc Franklin of Stan-
ford Law School, in the recently published results of a statistical
study he conducted on 291 reported libel suits against the media,'
states that the defendants in the reported cases won about 75 per-
* B.A., University of Montana, 1974; J.D., University of Montana, 1979; LL.M.,
Georgetown University Law Center. The Washington, D.C. firm of Leighton, Conklin,
Lemov, Jacobs & Buckley has retained Mr. Smith to litigate the appeals of former air traffic
controllers.
1. The first two verdicts were reduced by the trial judge and all are on appeal; the
third was recently overturned by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals at Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l., No. 81-1480 (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 1982). See Kupferberg, Libel Fever, 20 COLUM. JOUR-
NALISM REV. 3:36 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Libel Fever].
2. See id. at 40.
3. Franklin, Suing Media for Libel: A Litigation Study, 1981 Am. B. FouND. RESEARCH
J. 797 [hereinafter cited as Suing Media].
1
Smith: Libel Litigation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1983
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
cent of the time at both the trial and appellate court levels."
The final results of those cases notwithstanding, the growth of
libel litigation continues in Montana and nation-wide. This article
considers the possibility that a significant cause of that growth, as
well as one of the biggest problems for journalists and their law-
yers, is the "negligence rule" announced by the Supreme Court in
1974 in the case of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.5 The Court strug-
gled with the constitutional requirements of libel litigation for a
decade before settling upon the Gertz rule. In effect the rule states
that private figure plaintiffs, seeking to recover from media defen-
dants, need prove only a modicum of fault, presumably negli-
gence. Gertz, however, did little to explain how the principles of
negligence should work in libel litigation, a field in which that
standard had been previously all but unknown. The result has
been eight years of operating under vague constitutional limits,
which in effect may have come to mean no limits at all. Eight
years' experience in implementing the decision has shown the
"negligence rule" to be incorrect. Although the rule's results can-
not be termed disastrous, the rule continues to restrain the media
and ought to be changed. While Montana unfortunately appears to
be at the brink of adopting the Gertz negligence rule, it is still
possible for the Montana Supreme Court to better protect the free-
dom of the media by discouraging oppressive libel litigation.
II. THE GERTZ RULE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. The Rationale Behind the Rule
The plaintiff in Gertz was an attorney who had represented a
family in their controversial suit against a policeman convicted of
murdering their son. The defendant's magazine, American Opin-
ion, a voice for the John Birch Society, published an article accus-
ing Gertz of being a "Communist-fronter" and being an "architect
of the 'frame-up'" of the policeman convicted of the murder, along
with other defamatory inaccuracies. 7 Gertz sued, taking his case to
the Supreme Court to reinstate his jury verdict.
Since the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,8
decided in 1964, public officials suing the media for libel had to
prove the defamatory falsehoods were published with "actual mal-
4. Id. at 802.
5. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
6. Id. at 347.
7. Id. at 326.
8. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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ice," that is, with knowledge that the statements were false, or
with "reckless disregard" of whether they were false.' The Court
extended this requirement three years later to plaintiffs who were
"public figures" 10
-persons not holding public office who are "inti-
mately involved in the resolution of important public questions or,
by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society
at large.""
Justice Powell and four other members of the Court did not
consider Gertz a public figure, subject to the Times rule, "for all
aspects of his life," nor did this majority consider him a public
figure for the subject matter of the defamatory statements. He had
achieved "no general fame or notoriety in the community,"1 2 nor
had he "thrust himself into the vortex" of the public issue ad-
dressed by the defamatory statements."3
The Court also had to decide whether the Times rule would
apply to Gertz because the subject matter of the article in question
addressed a topic of public interest. Three members of the Court
had held in a 1971 case, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.," that
the Times rule should apply in such matters of public interest: "If
a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot sud-
denly become less so merely because a private individual is in-
volved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'volunta-
rily' choose to become involved. 1 5 The Gertz majority, however,
rejected that holding.
Gertz ruled that "so long as they do not impose liability with-
out fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual."16 Gertz thus requires
private figure plaintiffs to prove no more than a minimal amount
of fault (presumably no more than negligence)1 7 in order to recover
against the news media for defamatory falsehoods even when mat-
ters of genuine public interest are involved in the statements.1 8
9. Id. at 280.
10. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
11. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result).
12. 418 U.S. at 351-52.
13. Id. at 352.
14. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
15. Id. at 43.
16. 418 U.S. at 347.
17. See id. at 360 (Douglas, J., dissenting), 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 376 (White,
J., dissenting).
18. In addition to imposing the fault requirement in private figure litigation, the Court
also held that private figure plaintiffs cannot recover punitive damages without showing
actual malice, as defined in the Times case, and that actual damages will no longer be pre-
19831
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Justice Powell supported the Court's holding by asserting
that, although "there is no such thing as a false idea" under the
First Amendment, and that the competition of ideas is the proper
means for correction in "pernicious opinion,"' 9 the legitimate in-
terest of the states in "compensating injury to the reputation of
private individuals" requires that a rule different from the Times
rule apply to them.2 ° Private individuals, he said, are more vulner-
able to injury because they have less of an opportunity to use the
media to counteract false statements than do public figures.2" Be-
cause private individuals have not voluntarily exposed themselves
to public scrutiny through seeking office or assuming some role in
the public spotlight, the media may not cover the activities of
those individuals with the same privilege with which they may
cover public figures. Private individuals, he said, "are not only
more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures;
they are also more deserving of recovery. "22
The states, however, were not given a free rein to develop the
rules for libel litigation. The Court imposed its "negligence rule,"
criticizing Rosenbloom for allowing a state to impose strict liability
upon a media defendant.2 3 The negligence rule was thus born out
of the concern to protect the media from oppressive litigation.
That rule, however, was poorly chosen.
B. The Theoretical Weakness of the Rule
The first amendment to the Constitution prohibits "any law
'abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.' "2 The Supreme
Court said in the Times case that if a state's libel law is not suffi-
ciently strict on the burden of a plaintiff suing a media defendant,
the first amendment 25 is violated just as surely as if a criminal
statute directly infringing first amendment interests had been
passed."
sumed, but must be proved. Id. at 350.
19. Id. at 339-40.
20. Id. at 343.
21. Id. at 344.
22. Id. at 345.
23. Id. at 346.
24. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
25. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (applied first amendment to states via
fourteenth amendment).
26. "What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal
statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage
awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be
markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute."
N.Y. Times Co. v. SullivAn, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964).
[Vol. 44
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In considering the restrictions the Constitution places upon
state libel law, the Court in the Times case analyzed three factors.
First, the first amendment was written to ensure the free in-
terchange of ideas that is necessary to bring about desired political
and social change.2 7 Second, some degree of abuse, including fac-
tual error and injury to official reputation, must be tolerated by
the law in the debate on public issues in order that that debate
remain "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. ' 28 Third, by requiring
critics of official conduct to guarantee the truth of their statements
or suffer potentially incapacitating judgments, the existing libel
law imposed an unconstitutional form of prior restraint, or in the
words of the Court, "self-censorship. '2 9
The Gertz opinion did recognize the importance of public de-
bate on significant social and political issues, and it supported the
tolerance of some abuse to further that debate.30 Its treatment of
the self-censorship issue, however, led to a different result from
that in the Times case. Gertz balanced the need to avoid self-cen-
sorship with the "legitimate state interest" of compensating indi-
viduals for the damages suffered from the publication of defama-
tory falsehoods." Because private individuals do not voluntarily
expose themselves to the public spotlight, and because they have
less access to the channels of public communication, the balance
weighed in favor of a less restrictive rule than that announced in
the Times case for public officials.2 Because the Gertz majority
wanted to protect the media from "the rigors of strict liability for
defamation," 3 it announced the rule requiring proof of fault.
The Gertz opinion lacked any explanation of why self-censor-
ship is any less important an issue merely because private individ-
uals have sued. It argued only that the interest of private individu-
als in recovering is greater than that of public figures. The opinion
also failed to explain how the "negligence rule" would free the me-
dia from the "rigors of strict liability," either by referring to any
cases employing the negligence standard, or by analyzing how the
negligence standard would operate in the context of libel litigation.
In short, the Court proceeded on the bald assumption that the me-
dia would be less subject to libel judgments, and thus self-censor-
ship would be less of a problem, if they could not be held liable
27. Id. at 269 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
28. Id. at 270-72.
29. Id. at 279.
30. 418 U.S. at 340.
31. Id. at 341.
32. Id. at 344-45.
33. Id. at 348.
1983]
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without being shown not to have taken "every reasonable precau-
tion" to ensure the accuracy of published statements."
Some lauded the Court for its decision, 5 but criticism was am-
ple and varied. Justice White, dissenting, criticized the new rule
for going too far. It would, he said, require the states to fashion
new rules for the recovery of damages and require definition of the
vague concept of liability without fault, even though these aspects
of the Gertz rule had "not been briefed or argued by the parties
and their workability [had] not been seriously explored." 36
Others criticized the rule for being too harsh on the media.
Justice Brennan, who had written the Rosenbloom plurality opin-
ion, dissented from the Gertz case, arguing that by departing from
the Rosenbloom "public issue" rule, the Gertz holding would put
on the media "the intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might
assess the reasonableness of steps taken . . . to verify the accuracy
of every reference to a name, picture or portrait.
' 37
Perhaps the most eloquent criticism of Gertz has come from
Professor David Anderson. He argued that the principles of negli-
gence in a common law context serve a very different function than
negligence as a constitutional "prerequisite."38 Negligence law de-
veloped to give the judge and jury flexibility to deal with the liabil-
ity question in a variety of cases in which reasonable person stan-
dards may apply-those involving traffic accidents, slips on icy
sidewalks, and the like. Certainty of results in these cases may not
be expected, or even desired. 9 Injecting a reasonable person stan-
dard into libel litigation as a constitutional matter raises quite dif-
ferent questions of application: should juries be allowed to infer
negligence from the mere fact of publication of defamatory false-
hoods;40 should journalistic standards be set by expert testimony,
or should juries be allowed to measure journalistic conduct by their
own values;' must private figure plaintiffs prove negligence by a
preponderance of the evidence, the standard usually applicable in
negligence cases, or must a more demanding standard, such as
34. Id. at 346.
35. See, e.g., Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REV. 199 (1976).
36. 418 U.S. at 380 (White, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 366 (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 365 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
38. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. REV. 422, 460 (1975) [here-
inafter cited as Anderson].
39. Id. at 460 (quoting Green, The Duty To Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 464, 470-71 (1965)).
40. Id. at 465.
41. Id. at 466.
[Vol. 44
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"convincing clarity, '42 be applied?"'
Gertz announced the negligence rule without answering these
questions. Furthermore, because of the conclusory manner in
which the rule was announced, the lower courts have little gui-
dance from Gertz as to what principles ought to guide the imple-
mentation of the rule, other than that the Constitution requires a
standard that makes it harder to recover against the media than
did the previous "strict liability" standard.
Not surprisingly, there is no consensus as to the proper appli-
cation of Gertz, and lawyers and journalists still struggle to per-
ceive its meaning. The following section discusses this problem.
III. COPING WITH THE GERTZ RULE
A. Adoption by the Courts
To escape liability, defamation defendants at common law
were required to prove the truth of the defamatory statements at
issue." They were also subject to a form of strict liability in which
due care and good faith were no defense to claims based on defam-
atory falsehoods.45 To recover punitive damages a plaintiff had to
show malice, but many jurisdictions presumed malice from the
publication of sufficiently defamatory statements." Of course, this
law was changed significantly in suits brought by public officials,
and later public figures, under the rule of the Times case. Gertz
modified the law in suits brought by private individuals against the
media, although to a lesser extent.
Even before Gertz, there had been "something of an undercur-
rent of rebellion against the strict liability rule, '44 and a number of
jurisdictions had held that negligence is a necessary element in a
defamation suit. The majority of the courts facing the issue since
Gertz have held that proof of negligence is sufficient in suits by
private individuals;48 but some courts have gone further than Gertz
42. That is the proof requirement of "actual malice" under the Times standard. N.Y.
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964).
43. Anderson, supra note 38, at 467.
44. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) 777 [hereinafter cited
as PROSSER].
45. "The effect of this strict liability is to place the printed, written* or spoken word in
the same class with the use of explosives or the keeping of dangerous animals." Id. at 773.
46. Id. at 772. Malice was understood in the sense of spite or improper motive, rather
than in the definition in the Times case. Id. at 771-72.
47. Id. at 774.
48. See, e.g., Pleagler v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 114 Ariz. 304, 560 P.2d 1216
(1977); Cahill v. Hawaiian Paradise Park Corp., 56 Haw. 522, 543 P.2d 1356 (1975); Stone v.
Essex County Newspaper, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975); Foster v. Laredo
1983]
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requires and imposed stricter proof standards on the plaintiffs,
such as those imposed in the Rosenbloom case.4
The courts have also differed somewhat in their articulation of
the negligence rules adopted. One court required the plaintiff to
show, when the substance of the statement "makes substantial
dangers to reputation apparent," that "the defendant knew or, in
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that the state-
ment was false, or would create a false impression in some mate-
rial respect."50 Another court required proof that the defendant
"knew or should have known that the defamatory statement was
false," but would not allow liability if the content of the statement
would not warn a "reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its
defamatory potential."'" Another court defined the fault a private
individual plaintiff must establish as either "negligent failure to
exercise due care, or a great degree of fault such as express or ac-
tual malice. '52
While the first two cases made it clear that the negligence
must occur in not discovering the falsity of the statement, the
third did not clarify whether the negligence must occur in not as-
certaining the falsity or in the act of publishing. Another jurisdic-
tion has held the latter view, that it is the "negligent publication
of a defamatory falsehood" that gives rise to liability." This is not
just an academic distinction. A rule of negligent publication could
have distinct results, such as imposing liability when a reporter did
all that was reasonably necessary to try to verify a defamatory
story, but the newspaper printed it in spite of unanswerable ques-
tions about the facts, or imposing liability when a television story
that had been killed because of its incorrect information gets aired
when a technician mixes up his instructions and pushes the wrong
button.54 These examples may be bordering more on the strict lia-
Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); Taskett v.
King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Walker v. Colorado Springs Sun, Inc., 188 Colo. 86, 538 P.2d 450, cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publica-
tions, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v.
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. App. 1978).
50. Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 86 Wash. 2d 439, 445, 546 P.2d 81, 85 (1976)
(entire quotation emphasized in original).
51. Foster v. Laredo Newspapers, Inc., 541 S.W.2d 809, 819-20 (Tex. 1976) (emphasis
added).
52. Thomas H. Maloney & Sons, Inc., v. E. W. Scripps Co., 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 109,
334 N.E.2d 494, 498 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
53. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 858, 330 N.E.2d 161, 168
(1975) (emphasis partially added).
54. For a discussion of this distinction at common law, see PROSSER, supra note 44, at
774-76.
[Vol. 44
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bility Gertz sought to prevent.
Applying these courts' holdings to the facts before them raises
even more doubts about the rules they announced. In a 1975 Mas-
sachusetts case, Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc.,55 an in-
experienced reporter covering a criminal trial of a young man ac-
cused of the possession of drugs was late for the initial part of the
trial and wrongly interpreted a reference to "Mr. Stone" to mean
the defendant's father. He wrote the story accordingly. The father
of the young criminal defendant sued the newspaper for libel, de-
spite a retraction published in a subsequent edition.
The editor knew Mr. Stone and was surprised that this good
citizen would be so charged, but did nothing in the 24 hours before
the story was published to check it out. The court on appeal
adopted the "negligent publication" rule and remanded the case
for a new trial under that rule.5
Few juries would have trouble finding negligent publication
under the facts of that case. That aside, however, what purpose is
served in awarding damages for a good faith publication once a
retraction has been published? Small newspapers that simply can-
not afford libel judgments, or libel litigation for that matter, may
be forced to have their editors check every reporter's facts, no mat-
ter how unlikely it seems to the editors that a mistake could have
been made. That could be a very heavy burden on any medium.
Suppose the reporter had been very experienced, the editor
did not know Mr. Stone, the city was very concerned about a rash
of drug abuse among its youth, and Mr. Stone and his son had the
same name and lived at the same address. If the story reported the
full name of the Stone boy and did not tell what his age was, which
stories normally include, some people might think it referred to
Mr. Stone instead of his son. A judge, unsure of what reasonable
minds might conclude about the conduct of the newspaper, would
probably turn the case over to the jury for decision. If so, the
newspaper might well face substantial damages even if its staff had
proceeded with the story with the best of faith and, arguably, the
best of journalistic judgement.
In Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co.,57 a 1976 Washington
case, the plaintiff was the owner of an insolvent advertising agency
that had begun dissolution proceedings. Notice of the proceedings
had been sent to all of his creditors, including the defendant televi-
55. 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975).
56. Id. at 858, 871, 330 N.E.2d at 168, 175. There was also some question about the
plaintiff's status as a possible public official.
57. 86 Wash. 2d 439, 546 P.2d 81 (1976).
1983]
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sion station. The plaintiff decided to get away from it all for a
month and flew to Mexico with his wife. He sublet his apartment
to a friend and, thinking his security deposit on his office would
satisfy the rent while he was gone, left the office unoccupied with-
out telling the landlord. An investigative reporter for the television
station spoke with the friend in the apartment, the trustee, and
some creditors, and also checked the court files. The reporter made
a call to a telephone number in Mexico that was on a note in plain-
tiff's office. The call revealed that the plaintiff had just left his ho-
tel. The subsequent story on the television news strongly inferred
that the plaintiff had skipped out on his creditors. When he re-
turned and heard about the story, he sued for libel.
It is difficult to imagine what else the reporter could have
done to ensure that the plaintiff had skipped out on his creditors if
the sources contacted gave no information about why he left.
Should the station have killed the story or held it until the re-
porter could talk to the plaintiff, even though the story clearly
packed substantial public interest, particularly among the plain-
tiff's several creditors? If a fear of a libel suit for running a seg-
ment that was reasonably well-researched causes the station to
hold or kill it, the very evil sought to be avoided by all the cases
from Times to Gertz-self-censorship-has reared its ugly head. A
station knowing that its conduct may ultimately be adjudged by
the standards of "reasonableness" in the minds of a jury, rather
than on more objective criteria announced by the judiciary, could
well be scared out of running the segment, especially if it is not a
large enough operation to budget comfortably for litigation.
In Taskett the Washington Supreme Court remanded the case
for reconsideration under a standard requiring the exercise of rea-
sonable care in learning the falsity of the statement or in knowing
that it would create a false impression in some material respect. 8
The court, in effect, put it in the hands of the jury to decide
whether the reporter's methods of investigation were sufficient.
In one curious case, the institution of the fault standard had
an apparently harsher effect on the newspaper defendant than did
the previous rule of liability without fault. In Thomas H. Maloney
& Sons, Inc. v. E. W. Scripps Co.,59 decided by the Ohio Court of
Appeals in 1974, the defendant had published an account of how
the plaintiff corporation tore down not only the building it was
hired to demolish but the one next to it as well. The company lost
58. Id. at 450, 546 P.2d at 85.
59. 43 Ohio App. 2d 105, 334 N.E.2d 494 (1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 883 (1975).
[Vol. 44
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a suit by the owner of the adjacent building for damages. When
the judgment against the company was issued by the court, the
defendant newspaper published its story. The errors it made were
an announcement of damages (when no damages had yet been de-
termined), incorrectly adding "Wrecking Co." in the name of the
plaintiff, incorrectly describing the type of building wrongly de-
molished, and incorrectly quoting the long-retired former proprie-
tor of the company as having told the judge, "I guess we got car-
ried away."0
The plaintiff company sued for libel. After discovery, the de-
fendant moved for, and won, summary judgment. Although the ap-
pellate report of the case did not explicitly state the standard of
care applied by the trial court, it is fair to assume from the opinion
that the common law rules of liability without fault were used. The
trial court thus apparently ruled that the statements were not
libelous per se and that there was no evidence uncovered in discov-
ery indicating that the statements had a libelous effect.61
In reversing the judgment and remanding the case for further
proceedings, the appellate court did not merely decide that the
lower court improperly found no genuine dispute of facts under the
summary judgment rule. The announcement of Gertz by the Su-
preme Court changed the posture of the case. The court said that
the record contained factual issues "made material" by Gertz.2 In
the words of the concurrence:
Gertz requires that the plaintiff in this case should have his day
in court; being a private citizen he should have the opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a
libelous article written about him and published, that the article
was false and that the defendant was negligent in the printing of
the article, and that the plaintiff was damaged. 3
Thus, the case presented an anomalous situation in which the
courts rejected any rule of common law that imposed liability with-
out fault, and at the same time reversed the lower court's finding
that the facts did not support a finding of strict liability, all on the
premise that the new law, speaking in terms of fault, gave the
plaintiff the right to try to prove fault to the jury. Although Gertz
imposed the fault element to give the media a measure of protec-
tion, the court in Maloney interpreted that element of protection
60. 334 N.E.2d at 496.
61. At common law, statements not ruled libelous per se by the court could not be the
basis for liability absent proof of special damages. See PROSSER, supra note 44, at 760, 763.
62. 334 N.E.2d at 499.
63. Id. at 503.
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to require the case to be resolved by the jury.
It is difficult to summarize the development of post-Gertz law,
other than to say that there is little predictability afforded by that
development. There are few guidelines as to what a jury ought to
consider in assessing the existence of fault, and thus it will be diffi-
cult to determine how a given jury is likely to rule. The variety of
negligence rules already announced, such as the negligent publica-
tion rule and the rule defining negligence in not learning of a de-
famatory statement's falsity, are not sufficiently tested in the
courts for anyone to know how they will operate in future cases.
The interaction of the new fault-oriented law with prior law on
liability without fault also poses questions that are difficult to an-
swer, as indicated in the Maloney case. By turning libel litigation
involving the media into essentially litigation of "journalistic mal-
practice," Gertz has forced the media and their lawyers to view the
practice of journalism in a new light.
B. Gertz in Montana
Because Gertz ruled on several aspects of libel law, including
standards of liability and limitations on damages, it will take some
time before the entire scope of the case is assimilated into the
courts of the various jurisdictions. Montana has begun this assimi-
lation, and all indications are that it will follow the majority and
adopt a negligence standard when squarely presented with the
question.
The portions of Gertz concerned with limitations on damages
recoverable in libel actions have now been explicitly analyzed by
the Montana Supreme Court in reviewing district court rulings on
appeal," but it is still something of an open question whether or
not the negligence rule will be adopted. The court correctly de-
clined the invitation to decide the question in Granger v. Time,
Inc.," a case seeking damages from a publisher for allegedly de-
faming property owners in Butte with an article concerning arson
in that city. The court affirmed summary judgment entered on be-
half of the defendants because the plaintiffs failed during discov-
ery to uncover evidence showing that the charge of arson was rea-
sonably understood by the article's readers to apply specifically to
the plaintiffs." Because of this, the court did not need to go to the
extra step and declare what standard of liability would be
64. See Gallagher v. Johnson, - Mont. -, 611 P.2d 613 (1980); Madison v. Yunker,
180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978).
65. 174 Mont. 42, 568 P.2d 535 (1977).
66. Id. at 49, 568 P.2d at 539.
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appropriate. 7
The court did, however, appear somewhat confused by the
parties' characterization of the question of the liability standard as
a first amendment issue. 5 The Granger opinion said that because
that issue "requires a careful balancing of the first amendment
freedoms of speech and press, and the personal dignity interests
underlying the law of defamation," and because the case was de-
cided on a non-constitutional basis, the liability standard would be
decided another time. 9 The court apparently ignored the fact that
the Gertz opinion had already engaged in that balancing and had
decided that the minimum-of-fault standard is what the first
amendment requires.70 Whether plaintiffs must meet a higher bur-
den than proof of ordinary negligence is now a matter of state law.
By characterizing the issue of the standard of liability a constitu-
tional one, the Montana Supreme Court may have locked itself
into an intellectual course that will lead it straight back to the very
analysis by which Gertz intended to give the states discretion to
adopt a tougher standard.71
The later case of Madison v. Yunker 72 is evidence that the
court has moved toward the adoption of a negligence rule without
exercising the discretion left to the states by Gertz. The principal
effect of Madison was to hold unconstitutional Montana's "retrac-
tion statute"7 3-a law that required plaintiffs to demand a correc-
tion of the allegedly libelous matter before suing. Madison held 74
that such a provision violates the provisions of the Montana Con-
stitution requiring the courts of the state to be open to every per-
son and afford remedies for injury to character.75
In its analysis, the court weighed its interpretation of the state
constitution's provisions on the right to sue with the requirements
of the first amendment as analyzed in Gertz. It quoted at length
the Gertz case's justifications for the minimum-of-fault rule it
adopted. Although the court's analysis of the state constitution
67. Id. at 51, 568 P.2d at 541.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. 418 U.S. at 347. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
71. The issue of whether the standard adopted by the states would be better deter-
mined judicially or legislatively is beyond the scope of this article, but is certainly well
worth consideration.
72. 180 Mont. 54, 589 P.2d 126 (1978).
73. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 64-207.1 (Supp. 1977).
74. 180 Mont. at 63, 589 P.2d at 131.
75. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 16 (1972).
76. See 180 Mont. at 61-62, 589 P.2d at 130.
77. See 418 U.S. at 347, 348.
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may have been somewhat peculiar, this kind of balancing was quite
appropriate under the circumstances.
What may have been less appropriate was for the court, after
making its determination, to proceed to give the district court a
dozen paragraphs of "guidance," consisting largely of quotations
from Gertz, on the applicable law of libel. 78 As is always the risk
when a court broadens the scope of an opinion with dicta, this
"guidance" did not focus carefully on the issues raised by the
Gertz rule. The result may have been an unnecessary and prema-
ture step toward adopting a negligence standard without under-
standing its implications.
The court stated for the district court, in very simple terms,
the standards of proof the plaintiff must meet if he were later
deemed (1) a private person or (2) a public figure. In the former
case, he would be required to prove the falsity of the published
material, "fault" on the part of the defendants "in the publica-
tion," and actual injury. In the latter case, he could recover only by
proof of the elements of malice as defined in the New York Times
case. 79 The court did not elaborate on whether "fault in the publi-
cation" amounted to negligence or some other form of fault. How-
ever, by contrasting a simple "fault" standard in cases involving
private person plaintiffs with the New York Times "malice" stan-
dard in cases involving public figure plaintiffs, the court has all but
adopted a negligence standard in Gertz-type cases. At the very
least it has made it very difficult, when properly faced with the
issue, to adopt a more stringent standard such as that employed in
the Rosenbloom case. 80 Nonetheless, the Madison court's failure to
engage in a more exacting analysis of Gertz and Rosenbloom must
not inhibit such analysis when the proper case arises. The court
ought to take seriously the discretion accorded it by Gertz and
consider the merits of the Rosenbloom rule.
IV. THE CURRENT LITIGATION STATUS
A. The Stanford Litigation Study
The Stanford Law School study involved the analysis of libel
suits against the news media reported over a four-year period.81
The study involved cases at the trial and appellate levels in both
state and federal courts. It broke down the cases into several cate-
78. See 180 Mont. at 61-67, 589 P.2d at 131-33.
79. Id. at 66, 589 P.2d at 133.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
81. Suing Media, supra note 3, at 799.
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gories, including procedural stages at which the cases were decided,
outcomes before and after certain Supreme Court decisions, out-
comes at the various procedural stages, different categories of
plaintiffs, the nature of the defamatory statements, and the role of
federal and state law in determining the results.
The study concluded, somewhat surprisingly, that recent Su-
preme Court cases apparently limiting the scope of the definition
of "public figure" for purposes of the application of the Times
privileges' had little effect on the outcomes of later cases."3 Per-
haps also surprising was the strong showing of success for media
defendants at most levels of litigation. Rulings appealed from the
trial court levels were made in favor of the defendants seventy-five
percent of the time, and the defendants prevailed in about sev-
enty-five percent of the plaintiffs' appeals. Plaintiffs prevailed in
thirty-one percent of all appeals.84 The plaintiffs obtained "suc-
cess" on appeal, defined as a ruling concluding the litigation in
their favor, in about five percent of the appeals, while the overall
success rate for the defendants was sixty-six percent.8 5
The thirty-seven cases on appeal that had reached the trial
stage are particularly interesting for the present purposes. Seven of
them were dismissed before jury deliberations began. Twenty-four
of the remaining thirty were decided by juries and six by judges.
Juries found for the plaintiffs in twenty of the twenty-four cases
submitted to them, while judges found for the plaintiffs in two out
of five. 6 Trial judges upheld seventeen of the twenty plaintiffs'
verdicts, reduced two, and granted one judgment notwithstanding
the verdict.8 7 Eight verdicts, fewer than half of those upheld whol-
ly or in part, were affirmed on appeal. Of the eleven jury verdicts
reversed, nine were dismissed, meaning the defendants had to take
the cases to the highest courts in the jurisdictions for determina-
tions that the cases should not have gone to the juries or should
not have been tried at all.88
The study did not provide a breakdown as to which of the jury
cases were Gertz cases, but it is fair to assume several of them
82. Holston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443
U.S. 111 (1979).
83. Suing Media, supra note 3, at 821.
84. Id. at 802.
85. Id. at 803.
86. Id. at 804. In the sixth case decided by a judge, the judge struck all defenses of a
defendant that refused to reveal a confidential source. That decision was vacated and re-
manded on appeal. Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Magic Valley Newspapers, Inc., 101 Idaho 795, 623
P.2d 103 (1980).
87. Suing Media, supra note 3, at 805-06.
88. Id. at 806.
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were. The study did show that at least fifty-three percent of the
fifty-one cases "codable" for specific falsity charges (cases in which
the issue of falsity and the type of falsity alleged could be deter-
mined from the reports) dealt with Gertz issues. Twenty-nine per-
cent involved a question of the negligence of the author, and
twenty-four percent concerned the reasonableness of relying on an
erroneous source.
8 9
If these percentages are representative of the overall percent-
age of the cases in the study, it could well be that many of the jury
cases involved Gertz issues. Recall that twenty out of twenty-four
juries and only two out of five judges found for the plaintiffs, and
that eleven of the nineteen plaintiffs' verdicts appealed by the de-
fendants were reversed, nine of them being dismissed on appeal.
To the extent that the element of the jury was added to the Gertz
cases, the media defendants faced an uncertain obstacle in their
defense and often had to take their cases to appellate courts to
prevail.
Of course, the existence of defendants' losses is not in itself a
measure of failure of the Gertz rule, just as the prevalence of de-
fendants' victories on appeal is not a measure of its success. How-
ever, the proclivity of the juries in the study to award verdicts to
the plaintiffs bodes ill for the media if jury trials in Gertz cases
become, in the words of one media lawyer, "little theaters."90
As expected, but also somewhat troubling in its degree, was
the result that Gertz defenses were substantially less successful at
the summary judgment and post-trial motion stages than were
Times defenses. Gertz defenses were successful at the summary
judgment stage in four cases, compared with twenty-four cases us-
ing Times defenses, and were successful at the post-trial motion
stage in one case, compared with fifteen cases using Times de-
fenses.91 This underscores even more the likelihood of Gertz cases
going to trial.
B. The Crippling Cost of Libel Litigation
When a media defendant is sued for libel, the alternatives are
most unpleasant: it can either settle for a substantial amount of
money or spend a substantial amount of money in litigation, at the
end of which a substantial judgment may still have to be paid. Be-
89. Id. at 820. Twenty-two percent of the cases were in the "other" category, some of
which conceivably were Gertz cases.
90. Interview with Bruce Sanford, attorney for United Press International (Nov. 16,
1981).
91. Suing Media, supra note 3, at 823.
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cause it increased the burden of plaintiffs attempting to collect
damages, Gertz may have reduced the risk to defendants at the
end of litigation. At the same time, however, it seems to have in-
creased the likelihood and the burden of going through litigation.
Because the negligence standard (which more states are adopting
than not)"' increases the likelihood of a judge's turning the case
over to the jury, plaintiffs may be less willing to settle at early
stages of the litigation. This may be especially true where the cases
involve questions about the functions of the editorial process that
are relatively unclear and would allow a jury to impose its view of
the proper standards.
The high cost of litigation can be particularly burdensome to a
media libel defendant, which, because it is in the business of mak-
ing public statements, may also be put in the business of defending
many of those statements in libel suits. Even short of going to
trial, legal fees for a media defendant in a single case can easily
run into five-figure numbers. Fees for a trial and an appeal, which
often is required on a libel case, can become astronomical. One re-
port says the defense of the Rosenbloom case cost nearly
$100,000.93 One newspaper with a circulation of between 100,000
and 300,000 reports that during the years 1976 to 1980, it incurred
legal fees of more than $165,000 for both litigation and counseling.
The fees ranged from a low of $7400 in 1976 to a high of $74,400 in
1980.1" Even when the defendant carries libel insurance, as some
forty to sixty percent of newspapers and broadcasters do,95 the in-
surance may not cover legal fees."
Few news organizations, and perhaps only those financially se-
cure and free from significant competition, can afford libel litiga-
tion without having to change their news policies. The New York
Times, for example, may be unique in not carrying libel insurance
and refusing to settle libel suits for money (as opposed to retrac-
tions),97 and not many can claim, as does the Washington Post,
that libel litigation has not changed their editorial practices.98
Quite clearly, the media in rural states such as Montana do
92. See supra notes 48 and 49.
93. Ek, Libel Insurance, in H. NELSON & D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATION
678, app. D. (2d ed. 1973).
94. Suing Media, supra note 3, at 800, n. 13. Insurance may have reimbursed some of
the fees. Premiums were $3000 each year with a $10,000 deductible in 1976, rising to $20,000
in 1980.
95. Libel Fever, supra note 1, at 39.
96. Anderson, The Selective Impact of Libel Law, 14 COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. 1:38,
42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Selective Impact).
97. Libel Fever, supra note 1, at 39.
98. Interview with "Bo" Jones, counsel for the Washington Post (Nov. 10, 1981).
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not own resources comparable to the metropolitan news organiza-
tions. Yet smaller media organizations are not immune to large
judgments. Libel litigation can be deadly to smaller and less
financially secure news organizations. For instance, the 38,000 cir-
culation Alton Telegraph, a southern Illinois daily, has had to seek
the protection of a bankruptcy court to save it from having to sell
its assets as part of a $9.2 million judgment. Reporters of the news-
papers turned up evidence that a local contractor had ties to the
underworld, but could not substantiate the facts and did not run
the story. The contractor's business lost its credit when the report-
ers sent a memo to the Justice Department of what they uncov-
ered. A successful libel suit followed.99
The owners of the prize-winning The Texas Observer related
the effects of a libel suit against that newspaper a few years ago.
They discussed candidly how the suit forced them to spend all
their energy on fund-raising activities to pay for the litigation,
while important stories, including a "solid" one on illegal business
practices in Dallas, went unreported. °10
The editor of the 6000 circulation Gadsden County Times of
Quincy, Florida, recently discussed the suit against his newspaper
by a state senator for stories reporting corporate fraud. He said
that even though the insurance company has paid the legal fees,
the drain on time and resources because of the suit has made him
reluctant to write further investigative stories.101
By being forced into a business environment in which plan-
ning for libel suits is as much a part of fiscal analysis as budgeting
for newsprint, ink, or television equipment, the news media may be
unique in having to figure as a cost of doing business the cost of
exercising a constitutional right. The first amendment, of course,
says nothing explicitly about the press being immune from the ex-
pense of libel litigation costs and judgments, and that probably
was not the intent of the language. Yet the constitutional prohibi-
tion of self-censorship decreed by the Times case '02 and reaffirmed
by Gertz'"3 must include within its scope any burden that unrea-
sonably inhibits robust reporting of important public affairs. The
Court in the Times case said that a rule requiring critics of official
conduct to guarantee the truth of their factual assertions "on the
pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount" leads to the
99. Libel Fever, supra note 1, at 36.
100. Selective Impact, supra note 84, at 41.
101. Libel Fever, supra note 1, at 39.
102. 376 U.S. at 279.
103. 418 U.S. at 340.
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constitutionally unpalatable result of self-censorship. 14 As the
Stanford litigation study has shown,10 a statistically high number
of media defendants do not ultimately suffer the "pain of libel
judgments," but they have to spend thousands of dollars to avoid
those judgments.
Litigation costs from an ever-increasing number of lawsuits
have become like a gadfly on the first amendment rights of the
news media. The lifeblood of the first amendment is the "unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and
social changes desired by the people."' 0 6 That lifeblood runs cold
when its exercise is too expensive.107
A carefully designed study following up the Stanford study
could provide the courts empirical evidence of how the media have
been rendered substantially less robust by libel suits against them.
Although the courts may be on the verge of further limiting the
amount of damages recoverable against the media in libel suits,108
the courts must be shown that the present state of the law also
fosters an intolerable amount of litigation.
C. The Value of the Rosenbloom Rule
The three-judge plurality in the Rosenbloom case, made up of
Justices Brennan, Burger, and Blackmun, extended the Times re-
quirement of the proof of actual malice whenever the matter re-
ported on concerns the "public or general interest."109 Part of the
rationale for that rule was the following:
The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is
on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect, and sig-
nificance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety .... We honor the commitment to robust debate on
public issues, which is embodied in the First Amendment, by ex-
tending constitutional protection to all discussion and communi-
cation involving matters of public or general concern, without re-
gard to whether the persons involved are famous or
anonymous.110
Some media lawyers "1 feel that the Rosenbloom rule would restore
104. 376 U.S. at 279.
105. Suing Media, supra note 3, at 802.
106. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
107. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971).
108. See supra text accompanying note 2.
109. 403 U.S. at 43.
110. Id. at 43-44 (footnotes omitted).
111. See supra note 73.
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some of the robust investigative journalism that has been missing
from the work of the media the last few years.
Perhaps the most troublesome criticism of the Rosenbloom
rule is its relegating to the judiciary the task of determining what
issues are and are not in the "general or public interest." Justice
Brennan, dissenting in Gertz, supported this result as merely caus-
ing the judges to perform "one of their traditional functions."1 '
Perhaps there would be problems in applying this rule, but under
the rubric of the "political and social change" sought to be en-
couraged by the first amendment,113 the courts could develop stan-
dards for the proper application. Courts are much better qualified
to apply a legal principle such as this than juries are to apply the
general concept of negligence to the field of journalism, in which
few, if any, generally recognized standards of practice exist. 14
V. CONCLUSION
The rule of the Rosenbloom case provided a much more effec-
tive approach to the "self-censorship" problem recognized by the
Supreme Court since the Times case in 1964. Gertz too hastily dis-
carded that rule in favor of its rule requiring private individual
plaintiffs to prove fault on the part of media defendants allegedly
guilty of libel. The experience of the courts has shown that the
Gertz rule, as a question of negligence, is very difficult to apply.
Because the Rosenbloom rule ostensibly makes it harder for
plaintiffs to recover against the media for libel, its replacement of
the Gertz rule probably would discourage much of the litigation
the media now face. That would reduce the exorbitant costs of li-
bel litigation now paid by the media to more acceptable levels.
Smaller news organizations, such as those prevalent in Montana,
could thus function under significantly less pressure.
112. 418 U.S. at 369.
113. See supra note 94.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 37-67.
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